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Abstract 
The impact of military spending on gross domestic product (GDP) growth is not clear and deserves detailed 
empirical analysis in order to discern which one (if any) of the effects prevails: do defense expenditures have an 
externality effect on an economy, specifically with regard to technological progress, infrastructure, and human 
capital formation or do they crowd out resources for investment and consumption, thereby hindering economic 
growth? The present study aims at investigating the relationship between military expenditures and economic 
growth in United States Of America (USA) using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing 
approach to cointegration tests for the period from 1970 to 2011. The results suggest that, there is the negative 
relationship between military expenditure and economic growth.   
Keywords: New Macroeconomic Model; Military expenditures; Economic growth, ARDL; USA. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between military spending and economic growth has attracted the interest of many economists 
and researchers since Benoit’s study (1973). Since then, scholars have carried on several studies which, among 
others, are to investigate the presence and direction of the relationship between these two variables, either at the 
individual country level or through the examination of large samples of countries. 
Numerous studies have examined the potential channels through which military spending affect the 
economy. Researchers are focused either on the supply-side neoclassical models or the demand-side Keynesian 
model Dunne et al., (2001). According to the Keynesian theory, military expenditure probably enhances the 
aggregate demand through the increased utilization of capital stock and higher investment and therefore 
stimulates economic growth. 
On the other hand, to the neoclassical model, military spending, encourage economic growth through 
innovation and spin-off effects. However, it may be plausible that economic growth is prior to military spending, 
in the sense that higher growth rate countries support their external and internal security by increasing defense 
spending or diverting resources to other more productive usage (Kollias et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, in the last two decades, defense spending has decreased dramatically. This is because the 
attribution of the end of the cold war, which reduced military expenditure and security Obligations all over the 
world.  However, by the end of the cold war and the last two decades, defense spending has decreased 
dramatically, which also reduced military expenditure and security obligation all over the world.)  The terrorist 
attacks against the US in September 2001 have once more intensified the argument whether higher military 
spending is necessary to provide a greater degree of security, thus encouraging and stimulating economic growth. 
As Deger and Sen (1995) mentioned that, from a purely economic viewpoint, the military spending is 
seen as the essential unproductive expenditure (except as insurance against war) and its influence on output 
growth would be negative. Until the important work of Benoit (1973), practically, all economic theorists had 
assumed the macroeconomic effect of military spending to be non-positive, although no empirical evidence was 
presented in this respect. However, even if defense spending does have an adverse impact on present economic 
growth, there is no necessary suggestion that such expenditures are damaged or too high because of the 
confidence effect mentioned above. The impact of military spending on gross domestic product (GDP) growth is 
thus not clear and deserves detailed empirical analysis in order to discern which one (if any) of the effects 
prevails: do defense expenditures have an externality effect on an economy, specifically with regard to 
technological progress, infrastructure and human capital formation or do they crowd out resources for investment 
and consumption, thereby hindering economic growth? 
Moreover, according to the SIPRI (2013), USA is the highest military spender in the world, and it 
provides the largest economic resources to this sector. The political argument debated that military spending 
might stimulate economic growth and, vice versa, whilst military cuts may have negative economic implications 
have been a popular discussion in the USA and it can be clarified by the strong impact of the complex defense 
industry in political decisions. One of the supporters’ claims for an extensive military policy is that decreasing 
military expenditures drive up unemployment (see Smith, 1977). For instance, Adams and Gold (1987) found 
that, reductions in military spending would create substantial unemployment because defense expenditure is 
labor-intensive. The proponents of high military spending stressed the fact that defense spending serves as a 
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catalyst for economic growth according to the Keynesian theory. 
Several investigations on the impact of military expenditure on economic growth in the US are 
frequently founded on supply-side specifications such as the work of; Atesoglu and Muller (1990), Huang and 
Mintz (1990, 1991), Muller and Atesoglu (1993), Ward and Davis (1992), and later, Atesoglu (2002).  Atesoglu 
(2002) employed cointegration approaches to evaluate the military-growth nexus in the US, and he concluded 
the existence of a positive relationship between military expenditure and gross domestic product growth.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between military spending and economic growth 
by applying the Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) Model in the case of the USA for 1970–2011. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the review of the literature. Subsequently, 
the following section provides an overview of the new macroeconomic model and the methodology is presented 
in the fourth section. The fifth section presents the data and the empirical findings of the relationship between 
military expenditure and economic growth and the conclusion is drawn in the sixth section.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the work of Benoit (1973), there has been growing interest in the literature on the relationship between 
military expenditure and economic growth. Nowadays, the argument is far from being complete. In fact, the 
varied results can be attributed to the multiplicity of theoretical models or econometric techniques employed. For 
instance, results from studies by Smith (1980),  Fredericksen and Kennedy (1983); Looney (1983); Faini et al. 
(1984); Ram (1986),  Deger (1986); Atesoglu and Mueller (1990); and Biswas, (1993);  Chletsos and Kollias 
(1995); Sezgin (1997), Brumm (1997); Aizenman and Glick (2003); Yildirim et al. (2005) are found to be 
congruent with  Benoit’s findings which support the Keynesian view on the impact of military spending. 
On the other hand, these findings have been challenged by several empirical studies. For example, 
Frederiksen and Looney (1986), Lim (1983); Deger and Smith (1983); Starr et al. (1984); Faini et al. (1984); 
Cappalen et al. (1984); Dunne and Mohammed (1995), Dunne et al. (2005); Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarm (2003); 
Galvin (2003); Atesoglu (2002); Halicioglu (2004); Yildirim et al. (2005); Bas (2005), and Sawhney et al. (2008) 
found negative correlations between defense spending and economic growth, which is opposite to the Benoit’s 
study.  
Moreover, the literature also contain some investigations which have failed to yield any significant 
relationship between these two variables for instance, Biswas and Ram, (1986); Choudhury, (1991); Mintz and 
Stevenson, (1995); DaKurah et al., (2001) and some researchers which have explored a bidirectional relationship 
between military expenditure and economic growth such as Joerding, (1986); Cuaresma and Reitschuler, (2004); 
Kollias et al., (2007).  
This evidence points to the continuing argument about the impact of military expenditure on economic 
growth. It endures to be one of the most congested areas in economics. As Kollias et al. (2004) discussed on the 
basis of the available various literature, it seems that the relationship cannot be generalized across countries and 
over time. The present study aims at making a contribution to this debate by providing empirical evidence from 
the US. 
 
3. MODEL AND METHOD 
We can start our model building with the augmented Keynesian cross model, where the macroeconomic output is 
measured from the expenditure side. The familiar equilibrium condition is; 
Aggregate Output = Aggregate Expenditure 
Similar modeling has been done by Romer (2000) and Taylor (2000) as well as Atesoglu (2002).  From their 
models, we obtain the equation (1), which shows that GDP comprises consumption (Ct) of the household sector, 
Investment (It) of the firms, government expenditures which can be split into non-military (GEt) and military 
(MEt) sector and the international sector (Xt). 
      	 
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 																																																																																1 
 
Then, the right-hand side variables in the equation (1) are determined by: 
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Where  stands for real taxes, and a, b, c, d, e and f are positive parameters. 
In this model, the method of Atesoglu (2002) in discussing  is like an exogenous variable, solving equations (1) 
to (5) to the reduced form of			 , we obtain the following equation; 
    !	  "
	  #  $ 																																																																									6 
Where GDP=α+b (GDP-C-dGDP) +e-Fr+g-hGDP-iR+GE+ME 
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GDP= α+GDP (h+b-bd)-bc+e-fR+g-iR+GE+ME 
GDP-GDP (h+b-bd) = α-bC+e-fR+g-iR+GE+ME 
GDP (1-b+bd+h) = α-bC+e-fR+g-iR+GE+ME 
GDP=
 
& -()(*)+,        {α-bC+e-fR+g-iR+GE+ME} 
 
  =  -./01)2)34- /0 /5)64   , ! ="  
 
- /0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/7)8
- /0 /5)64   and !,	" 9 0, #	 :0 
 
Equation (6) is a reduced form of the new macroeconomic model in which the government and military 
expenditure with real interest rates are extracted from the determinants of GDP. In natural logarithm form the 
estimating equation will be given by (7); 
;<    =;<
	  >;<	  ?;< 	 	@ 																																																														7 
 
Where GDP is real domestic product, ME is real government military expenditure, GE is real non-military 
government expenditure, and R is the real interest rate. and µ is the stochastic error-term. The parameters: 
=	, >	<		?	are empirically determined co-integration coefficients and C is the intercept term. 
 
4. DATA AND UNIT ROOT TEST 
Table I variables descriptions: Annual data: (1970-2011) 
Variable Description Source 
RME Military expenditure SIPRI (2010) 
RGDP Real Gross domestic product per Capita WDI (2010) 
RGE Public government expenditure WDI (2010) 
R Real interest rate WDI (2010) 
 
The four variables used in this study; namely real military expenditure, real general government 
expenditure, real interest rate and real GDP, using time-series data for over the period 1970–2011. The data are 
collected from various sources. For example, the data of gross domestic product (GDP), real general government 
expenditure and real interest rate are collected from World Development Indicator (WID), while the data for 
military expenditures are obtained from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 
We begin the empirical analysis with an investigation of the unit root test for the variables and we 
assumed that, the data used in this estimation are stationary. If the results of stationary are violated, this might 
lead to spurious results. In examining the time-series data properties, there are several models to test the 
stationary, but the most important one is the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) 
and the Phillips–Peron (PP) (Phillips and Peron, 1988) unit root tests. 
 
5. AUTOREGRESSIVE DISTRIBUTED LAG(ARDL) MODEL AND COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
To analyze time series data in different order I(1) and I(0) together, Pesaran et al. (2001) suggested, the 
Autoregressive distributed lag approach (ARDL) to test for cointegration as an alternative to cointegration model 
for Engle-Granger (1989). The study uses the ARDL model to investigate the long run and the short run 
relationship between variables. The ARDL bond testing approach for cointegration can be written: 
∆GDPH  αJ Kα 	∆GDPH/L 
M
LN 
Kα!		∆GEH/L
M
LNJ
Kα"		∆MEH/L
M
LNJ
Kα#		∆RH/L
M
LNJ
 
δ GDPH/  δ!GEH/  δ"MEH/  δ#RH/  μH																		8      
 
Here ∆ is the first difference operator; ∆GDPH stands for the natural log of real GDP,	∆GE stands for the natural 
log of real government expenditure,∆ME stands for the natural log of real military expenditure, R stands for the 
natural log of real interest rate and μH stands for the error correction term.  
The F test is used to determine whether the long-run relationship exists between the variables through testing the 
significance of the lagged levels of the variables. When the long-run relationship exists, the F test will show 
which variable should be normalized. 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration amongst the variables in the equation (8) is  
> =>!=>"=>#= 0  
Against the alternative hypothesis  
> U >! U >" U >#=0 
The F test has a standard distribution which depends on; (1) whether the variables are included in the ARDL 
model are I(0) or I(1); (2) the number of independent variables; (3) whether the ARDL model contains an 
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intercept and a trend; and (4) the sample size of the variables. According to Narayan (2005), the rejection of the 
null depends on the F-test and the critical bound tabulated value for small sample size.  
The long run relationship among the variables exists if the calculated value of F - statistic is greater than the 
upper critical bound (UCB), and if the calculated value of F- statistic is smaller than the lower critical bound 
(LCB), the long run relationship does not exist. If the calculated value of the F-statistic comes in between the 
range of LCB and UCB, then the long run relationship is inconclusive, Mintz (1990)  Hassan & Kalim, (2012). 
The optimal lag can be selected using the model selection criteria like Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
Narayan (2005) stated the maximum lags for small sample size is two lags. 
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Table II Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillip-Perron unit root test results USA 
                                             ADF                                           Philip-Perron 
                                                                           Level 
 Intercept Intercept and trend Intercept Intercept and trend 
  -1.715171 -2.459618 -1.861813 -1.590107 
	  -1.009772 -2.702574  0.002714 -1.998605 

	 -4.968409* -6.015342* -4.932968* -10.71829* 
 -2.715638*** -2.240513 -0.340197 -1.821726 
First Difference 
  -4.621860* -4.794549* -4.394975* -4.667337* 
	  -2.776816*** -2.586227 -2.763263*** -2.558414 

	 -8.239342* -8.108106* -18.99220* -18.53070* 
 -6.148899* -6.429485* -4.455223* -4.408573* 
*
 Denotes significant at 1%, 
**
 Denotes significant at 5%, 
*** 
Denotes significant at 10%. 
Table II shows the result of the stationary test for ADF-test and PP test respectively for the US case. 
Both tests revealed that GDP has a unit root at level, but it becomes stationary at first difference, which implies 
that GDP is I (1).  Nevertheless, all other variables are found to be significant at first difference and thus it 
indicates the variables are I (1). As the results point out, the variables are either I(0) or I(1), therefore implying 
that we can confidently apply the ARDL approach to this model as using ARDL requires the data to be 
stationary at the level I(0) and first difference I(1) (Narayan, 2005). 
Table III represents the co-integration test analysis, and the existence of a long run relationship has 
been established among the model’s variables. Results illustrate that the computed F-statistics are 4.020. The 
relevant critical value bounds at ten percent level (with unrestricted intercept and no trend) are 3.008 and for the 
lower and upper bounds respectively. Subsequently, the computed F-statistics is higher than the critical value of 
the upper bound, the null hypothesis of no long run co-integration relationship among the variables can be 
simply rejected.  
TABLE III ARDL BOUNDS TEST FOR CO-INTEGRATION 
Lag structure:                                                                                                            2,0,0,2 
F-statistics 1% Critical value 
  
5% Critical value 
 
10% Critical value 
 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
4.5766*** 5.018 6.610 3.548 4.803 2.933 4.020 
K=3, N=40 
The critical value according to Narayan (2005) (Case III: Unrestricted intercept and on trend) 
*, (**), (***) Significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table IV demonstrates the selected long ARDL model, based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The results show a positive and significant relationship between general government expenditure (	), and 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the long run. The results are revealed that improvement in the general 
government expenditure associated with improvement in gross domestic product. To be precise, the 
improvement of government expenditure by 1% leads to increase in GDP per capita by 0.578%. This finding is 
consistent with finding suggested by Mintz and Huang (1990) and Ward and Davis (1995). In other words, 
government military expenditure (
	 and real interest rate () have a negative impact on (GDP), while these 
relationships are statistically significant at 1%. The negative and significant relationship between economic 
growth and military expenditure may seem counterintuitive at first. Perhaps, the negative effects of military 
spending can be so pervasive as to carry over to arms exports. Another possible explanation for this negative 
relationship is a two-way causality where slower economic growth has a negative effect on military budgets, 
forcing more export sales in place of canceled domestic military contracts. In this case, there might be an 
identification problem for both military spending and net arms exports. 
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Table V shows the short run relationship between military spending and economic growth.  The results 
indicate that all of the variables in this model are statistically significant at one percent. Specifically, gross 
domestic product (DLGDP) is negative and significant at 1%, while public government expenditure (DLGE) is 
positively related to economic growth and significant at one per cent. Surprisingly, military spending and real 
interest rate are negatively related to economic growth. We found that military burden in the U.S.A does in fact 
have a negative impact on economic growth as a share of GDP; therefore increasing military-servicing problems, 
which indeed could have led to reduced economic growth in the US. Our empirical tests show that military 
spending does have adverse consequences on development by reducing productive capital investment. 
Furthermore, Yakovlev, Pavel (2007) found that higher military spending and arms exports separately lead to 
lower economic growth, but higher military spending is less detrimental to growth when a country is an arms 
exporter. 
TABLE IV ESTIMATION RESULTS LONG RUN RELATIONSHIP 
Lag Structure                                                                                                                           2,0,0,2                                       
Dependent variable: Gross Domestic Product (LGDP) 
 
Regressors Coefficient                                         T-Ratio [Prob] 
Constant -10.5020* -30.6928[.000]  
V	  .87762* 36.7145 [.000]  
V
	 -.27967* -9.0303  [.000]  
V -.023193* -3.5299  [.001]  
                                                              Diagnostic Test 
 
Test statistics:                   LM version                                     F version 
Jarque-Bera(normality) CHSQ(2)= 6.3016    [.043]       Not applicable        
LM test (1) correlation CHSQ(1)= .81791    [.366] F(1, 31)=  .64711   [.427] 
ARCH test CHSQ(1)= .0060382[.938] F(1, 38)= .0057371[.940] 
Ramsey RESET test CHSQ(1)= .10404    [.747] F(1, 31)= .080842  [.778] 
CUSUM test Stable Stable 
CUSUMQ test Stable Stable 
(*), (**), (***)
 denotes Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
TABLE V ESTIMATION RESULTS SHORT RUN RELATIONSHIP.  
Lag Structure                                                                                                                           2,0,0,2                                  
Dependent variable: Gross Domestic Product (DLGDP) 
Regressors Coefficient                                                                  T-Ratio [Prob] 
Constant -6.9219* -3.6962[.001]  
V/  -.59619 **             -3.7509[.001] 
V	/  .57844** 3.8492 [.001] 
V
	/  -.18433** -3.8757[.000] 
V/  .026939** 3.4848 [.001] 
V1/! -.011932 ***                      -1.8625[.071] 
	/  -.65910  *            -3.8804[.000] 
*, (**), (***) denotes Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Finally, when analyzing the stability of the long-run coefficients together with the short-run dynamics, 
the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMQ) are applied Following Pesaran 
and Pesaran cited in Bahmani-Oskooee (2001), the stability of the regression coefficients is evaluated by 
stability tests and they can show whether or not the model equation is stable over time. This stability test is 
appropriate in time series data, especially when we are uncertain about when structural change might have taken 
place. CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistics are plotted against the critical bound of 5% significance. According to 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Wing NG (2002), if the plot of these statistics remains within the critical bound of the 5% 
significance level, the null hypothesis (i.e. That all coefficients in the error correction model are stable) cannot 
be rejected. The plot of the cumulative sum of the recursive residual is presented in graph 1-2. As shown, the 
plot of both the CUSUM and the CUSUMQ residual are within the boundaries. That is to say that the stability of 
the parameters has remained within its critical bounds of parameter stability. It is clear from both the graphs 
presented in Figure (1-2) that both the CUSUM and the CUSUMQ tests confirm the stability of the long-run 
coefficients.   
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FIGURE I CUMULATIVE SUM OF RECURSIVE RESIDUALS.
 
FIGURE II CUMULATIVE SUM OF SQUARES OF RECURSIVE RESIDUALS  
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
The aim of this paper is to see if there is a relationship between military spending and economic growth in the 
US economy, wherein the government plays a significant role in the economies and large proportions of 
expenditure go to the military sector.  Since government expenditure is believed to underlie the macroeconomic 
instability and low economic growth in the US during the last decade, this study has investigated the effect of 
military spending on economic growth to show whether military expenditure leads to higher economic growth or 
hinder the growth rate since the US economic growth has declined because of its recent financial crises. 
This result reveals that when considering overall government expenditures, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between government civilian spending and economic growth. 
Further investigation revealed that military spending might be the cause of these findings.  In precise, 
military burdens negatively affected economic growth in the short run and long run.  This result corroborates 
earlier findings that military expenditure in the US is not determined by economic factors, but rather by the 
political situation in the country. The implications of this analysis are straightforward and could reduce the 
country’s military burdens. However, the effect of channeling the freed resources to civilian uses of economic 
growth is as clear as the direct effect. 
The finding in this study is consistent with some recent empirical studies, for example, by David 
K.Davis (1995) and Pavel Yakovlev (2007), where they found that, reducing military spending will stimulate US 
economic growth. Further, they concluded that, the relationship between both variables is negative, but it’s 
statistically significant. 
In this case, shifting resources from military to civilian spending seems to increase long-run economic 
growth; and resources must be reallocated from unproductive military sector to the civilian activities in order to 
foster US economic growth. Thus, reallocating resources from military to civilian spending may not result in 
increased growth unless the military allocation favors productive activities. 
The finding of this study suggests that the US economy military expenditure can play a non-productive 
role in the economy. This does mean that society will neither benefit from the reallocation of military spending 
as government spending does not have many goals in the society and economy, nor does it mean that military 
spending is the best way to achieve economic growth. It suggests that the US economy is currently being 
hindered by its current military burden, though the recent increase in military spending and downturn cyclical 
fluctuations have led to the military burden to be closed to its optimal level. Thus, further increases are likely to 
be at the cost of economic growth in the long run. 
 
REFERENCES 
Abu-Bader, S., & Abu-Qarn, A. S. (2003). Government expenditures, military spending and economic growth: 
Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
-5
-10
-15
0
5
10
15
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2011
of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2011
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.7, 2015 
 
189 
causality evidence from Egypt, Israel, and Syria. Journal of Policy Modeling, 25(6), 567-583. 
Adams, G., & Gold, D. (1987). Defense Spending and the Economy: Does the Defense Dollar Make a 
Difference? : Defense Budget Project at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
Aizenman, J., & Glick, R. (2003). Military expenditure, threats, and growth: National Bureau of Economic 
Research: New York. 
Atesoglu, H. S. (2002). Defense Spending Promotes Aggregate Output in the United States--Evidence from 
Cointegration Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics, 13(1), 55-60. 
Atesoglu, H. S., & Mueller, M. J. (1990). Defence spending and economic growth∗. Defence and Peace 
Economics, 2(1), 19-27. 
Bahmani-Oskooee, M. (2001), "Real and Nominal Effective Exchange Rates of Middle Eastern Countries and 
Their Trade Performance", Applied Economics, Vol. pp. 103-111. 
Bahmani-Oskooee, M and Wing NG, R.C. (2002). " Long-run Demand for money in Hong Kong: An application 
of the ARDL model." International journal of Business and Economics, 2002,Vol.1, No.2, 147-155 
Bas, M. A. (2005). Military spending, investment and economic growth: Relaxing the linearity assumption: 
Working Paper, University of Rochester 1–36. 
Benoit, E. (1973). Defense and economic growth in developing countries: Lexington Books: Lexington, MA. 
Biswas, B., & Ram, R. (1986). Military expenditures and economic growth in less developed countries: an 
augmented model and further evidence. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 34(2), 361-372 
Brumm, H. J. (1997). Military spending, government disarray, and economic growth: a cross-country empirical 
analysis. Journal of Macroeconomics, 19(4), 827-838. 
Cappelen, Å., Gleditsch, N. P., & Bjerkholt, O. (1984). Military spending and economic growth in the OECD 
countries. Journal of Peace Research, 21(4), 361-373 
Chletsos, M., & Kollias, C. (1995). Defence spending and growth in Greece 1974–90: some preliminary 
econometric results. Applied Economics, 27(9), 883-890. 
Chowdhury, A. R. (1991). A causal analysis of defense spending and economic growth. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 35(1), 80-97. 
Cuaresma, J. C., & Reitschuler, G. (2004). A non‐linear defence‐growth nexus? Evidence from the US 
economy. Defence and Peace Economics, 15(1), 71-82. 
Dakurah, A. H., Davies, S. P., & Sampath, R. K. (2001). Defense spending and economic growth in developing 
countries: A causality analysis. Journal of Policy Modeling, 23(6), 651-658. 
Deger, S., & Sen, S. (1995). Military expenditure and developing countries. Handbook of defense economics, in: 
Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, 
pages 275-307 Elsevier. 
Deger, S., & Smith, R. (1983). Military expenditure and growth in less developed countries.  Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 27(2), 335-353. 
DiPietro, W. R., Anoruo, E., & Sawhney, B. (2008). The Effect of the Size of the Military on Stock Market 
Performance in the United States and the UK. Kyklos, 61(1), 33-44. 
Dunne, J. P., & Mohammed, N. A. (1995). Military spending in sub-saharan Africa: Some evidence for 1967-85. 
Journal of Peace Research, 32(3), 331-343.  
Dunne, J. P., Smith, R. P., & Willenbockel, D. (2005). Models of military expenditure and growth: A critical 
review. Defence and Peace Economics, 16(6), 449-461.  
Dunne, P., Nikolaidou, E., & Vougas, D. (2001). Defence spending and economic growth: A causal analysis for 
Greece and Turkey*. Defence and Peace Economics, 12(1), 5-26.  
Engle, R. F., Granger, C. W., & Hallman, J. J. (1989). Merging short-and long-run forecasts: An application of 
seasonal cointegration to monthly electricity sales forecasting. Journal of econometrics, 40(1), 45-62. 
Faini, R., Annez, P., & Taylor, L. (1984). Defense spending, economic structure, and growth: Evidence among 
countries and over time. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 32(3), 487-498 
Frederiksen, P. C., & Looney, R. E. (1983). Defense expenditures and economic growth in developing countries. 
Armed Forces & Society, 9(4), 633-645. 
Galvin, H. (2003). The impact of defence spending on the economic growth of developing countries: a cross-
section study. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(1), 51-59. 
Halicioğlu, F. (2004). Defense spending and economic growth in Turkey: an empirical application of new 
macroeconomic theory. Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, 2(3), 193-201 
Halicioğlu, F. (2004). Defense spending and economic growth in Turkey: an empirical application of new 
macroeconomic theory. Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, 2(3), 193-201. 
Hylleberg, S., Engle, R. F., Granger, C. W., & Yoo, B. S. (1990). Seasonal integration and cointegration. Journal 
of econometrics, 44(1), 215-238. 
Joerding, W. (1986). Economic growth and defense spending: Granger causality. Journal of Development 
Economics, 21(1), 35-40. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.7, 2015 
 
190 
Kollias, C., Manolas, G., & Paleologou, S.-M. (2004). Defence expenditure and economic growth in the 
European Union: a causality analysis. Journal of Policy Modeling, 26(5), 553-569. 
Kollias, C., Mylonidis, N., & Paleologou, S. M. (2007). A panel data analysis of the nexus between defence 
spending and growth in the European Union. Defence and Peace Economics, 18(1), 75-85. 
Lim, D. (1983). Another look at growth and defense in less developed countries. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 31(2), 377-384. 
Looney, R. E., & Frederiksen, P. C. (1986). Defense expenditures, external public debt and growth in developing 
countries. Journal of Peace Research, 23(4), 329-337.  
Mintz, A., & Huang, C. (1990). Defense Expenditures, Economic Growth, and The" Peace Dividend". The 
American Political Science Review, 84(4) 1283-1293.  
Mintz, A., & Huang, C. (1991). Guns versus butter: The indirect link. American Journal of Political Science, 
35(3), 738-757. 
Mintz, A., & Stevenson, R. T. (1995). Defense expenditures, economic growth, and the “peace dividend” A 
Longitudinal Analysis of 103 Countries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(2), 283-305. 
Narayan, P. K. (2005). The saving and investment nexus for China: evidence from cointegration tests. Applied 
Economics, 37(17), 1979-1990. 
Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., & Smith, R. J. (2001). Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level relationships. 
Journal of applied econometrics, 16(3), 289-326. 
Ram, R. (1995). Defense expenditure and economic growth. Handbook of defense economics, 1, Handbook of 
Defense Economics edited by K. Hartley and T. Sandler. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier 
Science Publication, pp. 251-273. 
Romer, D. (2000). Keynesian macroeconomics without the LM curve: National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No. w7461. 
Sezgin, S. (1997). Country survey X: defence spending in Turkey. Defence and Peace Economics, 8(4), 381-409. 
Smith, R. P. (1977). Military expenditure and capitalism. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1(1), 61-76. 
Smith, R. P. (1980). Military expenditure and investment in OECD countries, 1954–1973. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 4(1), 19-32. 
Starr, H., Hoole, F. W., Hart, J. A., & Freeman, J. R. (1984). The relationship between defense spending and 
inflation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28(1), 103-122. 
SIPRI (2013) SIPRI Yearbook.  World Armaments and Disarmaments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Taylor, J. B. (2000). Teaching modern macroeconomics at the principles level. The American Economic Review, 
90(2), 90-94. 
Ward, M. D., & Davis, D. R. (1992). Sizing up the peace dividend: Economic growth and military spending in 
the United States, 1948-1996. The American Political Science Review, 86, 748-755. 
Yakovlev, P. (2007). Arms trade, military spending, and economic growth. Defence and Peace Economics, 18(4), 
317-338. 
Yildirim†, J., Sezgin, S., & Öcal, N. (2005). Military expenditure and economic growth in Middle Eastern 
countries: a dynamic panel data analysis. Defence and Peace Economics, 16(4), 283-295. 
 
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event management.  
The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the following 
page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those 
inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version of the journals is also 
available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
Academic conference: http://www.iiste.org/conference/upcoming-conferences-call-for-paper/  
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek 
EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
